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Selections from Soviet Foreign Policy Journals



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INTERNATIONAL

ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EXAMINED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 5, Sep-Oct 81 pp 4-7

[Article by Ivan Ivanov, Dr. Sc (Econ): "Transnational Corporations And Developing Countries"]

[Text]

In the mid-seventies, the newly-free countries raised the problem of establishing a new world economic order. Restructuring international economic relations on a democratic and equal basis is historically justified. As progress is made towards this restructuring, special importance is attached to problems connected with the activities of transnational corporations in the developing world because their selfish practices seriously obstruct any changes in the existing economic relations. The young national states' control over and regulation of the activities of the transnational corporations is singled out as important within the overall complex of these problems. The right of the sovereign states to such regulation as well as the need for them to defend their national interests from the selfish policies of the corporations and their abuses are now universally recognised.

It is well known, however, that the attitude to these measures is not the same everywhere. For instance, many economists and politicians, particularly those from the developed countries with market economies, believe that national (or regional) regulation measures will only "scare away" the transnational corporations, deprive the emergent countries of access to the financial and technical potential of these corporations and in this way limit the possibility of using them for development purposes. What is more, some young states have no faith in their power to regulate the operations of transnational corporations on their territory and doubt that their struggle against them and their selfish practices will succeed, especially in light of

their severe shortages of capital and technology. These sentiments are being actively encouraged by the managers of transnational corporations.

We believe that it is all the more important to analyse the relevant events of the past few years.

It stands to reason that transnational corporations, having as they do substantial financial, technological and managerial potential, can, in principle,

make a certain contribution to the development of those countries in which they operate. It is likewise clear that as private enterprises supervised by narrow groups of stockholders and managers, first and foremost these corporations pursue selfish economic policies aimed at maximising profits, which runs counter to the national programmes and development objectives of Asian, African and Latin American countries and distorts their economies and foreign trade.

In fact, transnational corporations continuously violate the national sovereignty of the developing states on a large scale and impose inequitable terms of exchange on them. All this does grave damage to national planning in those states, reduces their accumulation, export, and budgetary revenue, upsets their balances of payments and breeds internal political instability.

In the mid-seventies, the developing countries earned about \$30,000 million a year from raw material exports (excluding oil) to the market-oriented developed countries, whereas the consumers in those countries paid for them about \$200,000 million. This clearly illustrates the monopoly price

formation favouring the transnational corporations, which impose underpricing vis-à-vis producers and overpricing vis-à-vis consumers.

II

The natural question is whether or not the developing countries can regain sovereignty over their natural resources and establish effective national control over the economic activities of all companies operating on their territories. This task is far from easy because the vanguard of the transnational corporations is comprised by multibillion dollar giants which are active in many countries the world over and frequently surpass both the governments and local capital of the recipient countries in financial and economic potential.

For instance, in India, as the *Indian Economic Journal* pointed out, the local market constitutes less than one per cent of the volume of the global operations of such transnational corporations as Union Carbide, ICI, and Unilever. This alone gives them overwhelming influence at talks on commerce, influence far exceeding anything the domestic companies can bring to bear. Apart from that, when transnational corporations are in conflict with the host country, they apply to the governments or diplomatic apparatus of their home countries for aid. American scholar Brookstown has pointed out, for instance, that US foreign policy is directly aimed at ensuring guarantees for private property, free markets, and profits for US businessmen operating internationally. This situation is more or less characteristic of other countries as well.

However, today there are strong factors favouring the developing countries and protecting their national interests in this sphere. Politically, these are, above all, international detente, which, although it has come under attack by its enemies of late, drastically narrows the possibility of the actual use of military force as a weapon of imperialist foreign policy, including its use in support of transnational corporations. For instance, the idea of the military occupation of oil-fields in countries participating in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries and sabre-rattling in connection with the events in Iran and the Iranian-Iraqi conflict are now regarded as an irresponsible venture even by the Western countries themselves. Apart from that, the unity and solidarity of the developing countries is growing at the regional level, within the nonaligned movement and in the UN agencies, which makes their

struggle against transnational corporations collective and public and at the same time wins them the support of progressive world public opinion.

It is also fundamentally important that world transnational corporations have already lost their monopoly of finances and technology essential for development which are provided to the developing states by socialist countries for the most part. In addition socialist countries offer these states equal economic relations. Economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the developing countries themselves and their contacts with the public, non-monopolistic sectors of the economies of Western countries should be viewed as new opportunities in this field. For instance, trade between the newly-free countries themselves already accounts for about one quarter of their total foreign trade, and they have developed a comprehensive programme of "collective self-reliance" which has made

itself felt in the world strategy of development for the third UN Development Decade. As for non-monopolistic enterprise, at present it generates 15 per cent of the aggregate exports in the US, 36 per cent in France, 35 per cent in Japan, and also has a certain financial and technological potential.

The success of the developing countries in using alternative sources of finance and technology, thus bypassing transnational corporations, is facilitated by competition between those corporations themselves. For instance, Libya has concluded agreements with "outsiders" in the sphere of oil and gas production on terms which were patently unacceptable to members of the international oil cartel. Japanese companies in Peru have accepted terms that were previously turned down by US competitors. Similar occurrences took place in Papua-New Guinea and a number of other countries. Lastly, it should be borne in mind that transnational corporations lord it over the raw materials and fuel markets with the buyers making all the rules. However, the initiative is increasingly being taken by the sellers. The developing countries' attempts to gain access to transnational corporations' finances and technology is counterbalanced to a large extent by the latter's attempts to gain access to raw materials on terms which are increasingly often laid down in the capitals of the developing states rather than Western countries.

In other words, given the present balance of world forces, the newly-free states are in a good position to resist

imperialist diktat and to secure control over operations both at the national and regional levels. Moreover, a well developed system of legislative measures and new, unconventional contractual practices have already evolved in this field.

III

By and large, these measures are aimed at extending the sovereignty of the developing countries over their natural and economic resources, and at achieving more equitable terms of foreign economic exchanges.

The more radical move in this area is the nationalisation of the transnational corporations' property, which reached its peak in the mid-seventies. Having originated in the field of finances and infrastructure, this process spread to the mining industry, plantations, and, during the past few years, to the manufacturing industries. Between 1960 and 1976 the UN recorded 1,369 cases of the nationalisation of foreign companies, above all, British, US and French. The majority of developing countries have fixed limits on foreign control of local enterprises. Lastly, over 70 inequitable treaties concluded in the past between the governments of newly-free countries, on the one hand, and transnational corporations, on the other, have been revised. As a result, at present the newly-free states control considerable share of the extraction of local raw materials and fuel, while in the manufacturing industries, the affiliates of transnational corporations are replaced by mixed companies. All these measures facilitate the more comprehensive inclusion of "enclaves" formerly controlled from abroad into the national economy and planning, and boost the profits of newly-free states.

At the same time, public enterprises are becoming increasingly widespread: transnational corporations do not possess any property at all in them but have only the status of contractors, consultants, licence-holders or salaried managers. These include, for instance, contracts on building "turn-key" enterprises, contractual agreements on prospecting and developing mineral resources, replacing former concessions, managerial contracts, licence agreements, engineering services, agreements on cooperation in marketing, etc. Agreements on industrial cooperation, subdeliveries, division of the range of products or stages of their processing, are coming into practice in the manufacturing industries.

Dominance of the economies of the developing countries by transnational

corporations is largely based on the shortcomings of economic legislation, which has for the most part either survived from the colonial period or been borrowed from Western models of law and order. However, at present large-scale revisions of these laws have begun in the national interests, and new, specialised laws are being introduced which directly affect the activities of transnational corporations. The requirements of new financial legislation, for instance, have made it possible to boost the percentage of reinvestment in the aggregate inflow of private capital into the developing countries from 34 per cent in 1965 to 40 per cent in 1976. The aggregate level of taxation on the profits of transnational corporations in the oil and copper industries of the developing countries went up from 50-55 per cent in the 1950s to 70 per cent in the 1970s, etc.

Of course, these innovations and how widespread they are differ from one country to another and from one economic sector to another depending on their level of development, the economic policies of individual newly-free countries, and the world market situation for individual commodities. For instance, the less developed of the newly-free countries still have to agree to direct investment of foreign capital, although qualified by certain commitments of the transnational corporations. The states which have attained a medium level of development prefer mixed companies and managerial contracts. The more developed of the newly-free countries (with the exception of those which attract foreign capital deliberately, in light of certain political considerations) give preference to stage-by-stage de-investment, contracts, franchise agreements, etc. Lastly socialist-oriented countries build "turn-key" projects on a large scale, conclude licence agreements and introduce comprehensive controls over the transnational corporations' operations.

Naturally, the general conclusions cited above are given on the average. Apart from that, these new forms of contractual agreements do not yet guarantee the elimination of inequality in the international division of labour and in trade exchanges between transnational corporations on the one hand and the developing countries on the other. Experience shows that transnational corporations can substantially affect the operations of even nationalised companies and plants, whereas the participation of the governments and local capital of newly-free states

in jointly owned companies often remains on paper. As a consequence, in a number of cases, transnational corporations merely get rid of a good part of the commercial risk and obtain profits on capital approximating the average profits on conventional enterprises, particularly in the manufacturing industries. However, beyond the shadow of a doubt, by and large the developing world firmly holds the initiative in controlling the transnational corporations' operations, and has already achieved initial success along this road.

IV

At the same time, even the most radical measures taken by the newly-free states at the national level can yield little effect when it comes to international operations of the transnational corporations. That is why control over the activities of those corporations within national (regional) economies should be complemented by a series of proper measures to be taken in international economic relations where these companies still control the processing of raw materials and commodity-carrying facilities including shipping, storage, market trade, and foreign trade financing and insurance as well. The programme of establishing a new international economic order, as is known, is called upon to alter the economic environment of newly-free states and to remove the more odious elements of inequality and exploitation from it.

Debates on this programme have become the main component of the UN's socio-economic activities during the past few years, but the talks conducted on the subject for many years have yielded very modest results so far, which was demonstrated anew by the 11th Special Session of the UN General Assembly in August-September 1980. Although these talks are conducted at an inter-governmental level at the United Nations, it is becoming increasingly clear that the West's stubborn resistance to the implementation of this programme is rooted in the policies and interests of transnational corporations which exert a decisive influence on the positions of their governments in this field. This influence is seen in virtually all the aspects of the programme for establishing the new international economic order.

For instance, as far as trade in raw materials is concerned, far from all transnational corporations are interested in implementing the integrated programme of the UN Conference on

Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on raw materials. At present these corporations control from one third to one half of the exports of raw materials from newly-free states, intermediary operations, and commodity markets, and therefore the conclusion of interdependent agreements on 18 basic raw materials commodities would alter the market situation largely to the detriment of the corporations and would be certain to put a halt to market speculation. Also, economically, the demand for an integrated programme for expanding the processing of raw materials at the sites of their production would mean that transnational corporations would lose and developing countries would gain the part of cost added by processing, and the corresponding profits.

The latter circumstance is a decisive factor in the West's attitude to opening their markets to manufactured goods from the developing countries. True, the unity of transnational corporations is split to a certain extent in this sense. Those of them which have an interest in cheap labour and a liberal ecological legislation have lately been shifting labour-intensive and ecologically "dirty" production processes to the developing countries. Part of the output of those production processes is subsequently exported to different countries, including Western ones. However, other transnational corporations, those specialising in processing raw materials, such as nonferrous metals, rubber, lube oil and petroleum in the developed countries, or those operating in traditional fields which feel competition on the part of newly-free states, such as the textile, shoe-making, steel and wood-working industries, are stubbornly resisting any expansion of this access.

The subversive role played by transnational corporations is even more obvious in the sphere of transfer of technology. The code of conduct in transfer of technology drafted by the UNCTAD will become an instrument regulating international exchanges in this field. As much as 80 per cent of the text of the code has been already prepared, but the work cannot be completed because no agreement has yet been reached on the sections related to transnational corporations. Western delegations claim that under conditions of "free market economies", their governments "cannot" be responsible for the conduct of transnational corporations, and therefore the document itself should not be mandatory, as Group-77 demands, but only offer recommendations. They also are dead-

set against the extension of the provisions of the code to operations on transfer of technology between the headquarters of the transnational corporations and their affiliates in other countries, and also between those affiliates and local companies in host countries. Last but not least, there are fierce debates over the question of what kinds of restrictive business practices of transnational corporations in this field should be outlawed. Western delegations consent to recognise only about 20 of the 44 such forms pointed out by the developing countries as malpractice.

Transnational corporations make their influence strongly felt in financing as well. In fact, corporations are interested above all in exporting their private capital to the developing countries and do not want any competition by official aid to development that is granted on far more liberal terms and, in particular, is partly covered by taxes paid by transnational corporations to the treasuries of their host countries. That is why the per cent of private capital in the financial resources made available to the developing countries has begun to grow again. Western delegations have secured the exclusion of the question of the developing countries' indebtedness to private creditors, mostly transnational banks, from the talks on revising the debts of the developing world.

Having established national control over a considerable portion of raw materials production, the developing countries are now making efforts to extend this control further along the chain linking producers and consumers, trying in this way to put an end to the misappropriation of profits by transnational corporations acting as intermediaries. It is this tendency that explains the developing countries' striving to extend the provisions of

the new international economic order to the sphere of maritime shipping. Under the code of conduct adopted by UNCTAD for regular shipping conferences, the developing countries have already secured the right to carry 40 per cent of their foreign trade's regular shipping using their own merchant marines. However, the bulk of their exports consists of mass cargo carried by tramps, and transnational shipping corporations continue to resist the extension of any international control over this shipping.

As far as the restructuring of international economic relations is concerned, especial attention is paid to the needs of the less developed newly-

free countries, and demands are being made to extend them greater privileges within a shorter time-frame than to the developing world as a whole. But transnational corporations' policy here, even in this "favourite" sphere, the export of capital, is at odds with the demands of the newly-free countries. Capital obviously favours countries with rich natural resources, large domestic markets and a comparatively high level of development, while ignoring the less developed countries and their needs. For instance, transnational corporations channel half of their investments into countries with a per capita annual income exceeding \$1,000 and only one fourth to countries with the per capita income below \$500 a year.

The list of such examples could be continued. However, what has been said is enough to show that prospects for the implementation of the new international economic order largely depend on the extent to which transnational corporations can be effectively countered within its context, and this task seems to be of primary importance.

V

All this prompts the conclusion that transnational corporations, although trying to adapt, to a certain extent, to changes taking place in the developing countries, nevertheless are strong enough to try and oppose them and, while giving in on matters of secondary importance, strive to preserve their principal positions, namely, their role of intermediary between producers from the developing world and consumers from the developed countries and vice versa. That is why it would be logical to review the sources of this strength today.

There are several such sources, and, apart from the financial and technological potential of transnational corporations themselves and their experience, they are to be found both in the developed Western countries and in the newly-free states themselves.

As for the developing countries, the transnational corporations' principal way of survival here consists in a search for different forms of "merger" with the local bourgeoisie while preserving dominance in this partnership.

To this end, the local proprietors depending on transnational corporations or loyal to them are given sub-contracts, control over a part of subsidiary operations, the functions of marketing and servicing, stocks, tied up credits, etc.

Naturally, in this way transnational corporations create a "fifth column" in host countries and gain a foothold within sovereign states. Monopolistic circles merge with the elite of developing countries, who become closely tied to transnational corporations, US economist L. Solomon points out. In so doing, transnational corporations vigorously recruit new allies and brainwash the public with the help of the mass media. Taken together, this machinery is used to bring pressure to bear on the economic policies of the developing countries from within while transnational corporations themselves remain behind the scenes.

The transnational corporations' "fifth column" proves rather effective on many occasions. Under pressure from it, the law on foreign investments was amended in Egypt, a new tax

law was made in the Shah's Iran, development programmes in Saudi Arabia and the patent law and prices for medicines on the Philippines, etc., have all been affected.

In other words, the need to control the activities of transnational corporations effectively should be viewed in a far broader context than that of the new international economic order, which introduces reforms only within the foreign contacts of the developing countries. In particular, it calls for progressive internal reforms which could deny transnational corporations the possibility of creating their lobbies in host countries and ensure their control by national patriotic, democratic forces. This, perhaps, is the main conclusion prompted by the developments in this field over the past few years.

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U.S. MILITARISM IN ASIA CONDEMNED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 5, Sep-Oct 81 pp 7-9

[Article by Yuri Lugovskoy: "Diplomacy of Military Bases"]

[Text]

An extensive programme of measures to improve the international climate put forward by the 26th CPSU Congress (February-March 1981) envisages the dismantling of imperialist military bases on the territories of other countries. Practice shows that these bases have become an instrument of constant pressure on the sovereign states of Asia and Africa, threatening the entire system of international cooperation.

Pursuing their foreign policy from position of strength, US geopoliticians are doing their best to get hold of military bases and strongholds in various parts of the world, which they have arbitrarily declared to be spheres of their "vital interests".

Significantly, back in 1977, that is prior to the events in Iran and Afghanistan, the Pentagon started discussions on a project for a mobile punitive corps which later became known as a "rapid deployment force". At about the same time, a new global strategy was elaborated by the USA, whose long-term purpose was to pave the way for new medium-ranged nuclear missiles and operations by large units of the air force and navy from advanced positions.

As far as the Indian Ocean and the Pacific were concerned, that strategy was manifest primarily in the US desire to dominate there militarily and strategically and to create a ramified network of military bases from which the Pentagon could menace the independent states of the region and influence their domestic development. Since such a frankly hostile attitude had to be justified or camouflaged somehow, US diplomatic circles and mass media used the old myth of a "Soviet menace" as a smokescreen.

The campaign reached its peak in December 1979, when Soviet troops were moved to Afghanistan to meet repeated requests from the Afghan government. It was just then that the CIA and its obedient servant, the mass media, began spreading rumours about Soviet tanks ready to move out towards the Persian Gulf, cutting off the West from the Middle East oil reserves. And although, naturally, nothing of the kind happened, the USA concentrated an unprecedented naval armada in the Persian Gulf area.

There are plans for the US 5th Fleet to be stationed permanently in the Indian Ocean. The huge sum of \$14 billion has been allocated for this buildup; the fleet, consisting

of at least 15 men-of-war, is supposed to operate from Diego Garcia in the centre of the Indian Ocean and other bases on its periphery. The Sri Lanka Forward newspaper wrote that the USA had begun stockpiling nuclear warheads in the underground warehouse on the Diego Garcia base.

Directive 51 issued by Carter and, by the way, not cancelled by anyone in Washington, stipulates the use of nuclear weapons in "local wars" which US troops may wage in the Middle East. The Diego Garcia Bay was recently deepened by 15 metres, and is now capable of handling aircraft carriers and nuclear missile submarines, while its air base can accommodate various aircraft including B-52 strategic bombers, gigantic S-5A and S-141 military transport jets, and the KS-135 tanker aircraft.

By the present time, Diego Garcia has been turned into a huge warehouse of combat materiel, munitions, fuel and food. According to the Afrique-Asie magazine, the stockpiles are sufficient to supply a landing brigade of 12,000 marines for a month of fighting. In the near future, the island may become a transit site for "rapid deployment force" units. It is not by chance that Chester Bowles, former US Ambassador to India admitted in The New York Times that no matter what explanations America might present, Diego Garcia was a fresh example of unprovoked US interference in Asia.

Plans to create and station the "rapid deployment force" in the Middle East have entered the stage of implementation. But the Middle East is not the only region affected: US strategists are preparing positions for the units' possible actions in Southeast Asia, the Far East, and in Southern and Eastern Africa. While this force, ultimately to consist of 325,000 men, is being hastily created, the Pentagon has started a crusade to get hold of military bases in different parts of Asia and Africa, to make them transit sites for quick transportation of punitive units. As it is, the USA maintains about 500,000 officers and men stationed at 400 major military bases with 1,700 nuclear warheads, scattered throughout the world. As Defence Secretary Weinberger stated in a House of Representatives committee, the USA absolutely must secure its presence in the region [the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.—Y. L.]. He also urged the US to set up installations there to make its presence "convincing".

The USA has established or is establishing bases in Berbera and Mogadishu (Somalia), in Mombasa, Nairobi and Nanewky (Kenya). A former British air base in Masirah Island, a possession of Oman, has been turned over to the Pentagon. Besides, the Sultan of Oman has put the bases of Seeba, Tamarita, Muscat, Matra and Reisuta at US disposal. All in all, the USA has over 30 military bases in the region. To step up its military presence in the Indian Ocean, Washington is going to spend \$25 billion in the coming five years.

The Pentagon is also making haste to prepare its reserve positions in South Africa where it got hold of the base in Simonstown and is equipping the port of Richard's Bay. Washington pins special hopes on the Camp David deal, which is proved by the negotiations that Secretary of State Haig conducted in Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the course of his Middle East trip in April of this year. The negotiations centred around the so-called multinational armed forces supposedly to be deployed on the Sinai Peninsula.

Under that pretence, however, the Pentagon is going to station the "rapid deployment units" there, first and foremost. According to the Washington Post, President Reagan informed Congress leaders he intended to send a military detachment of no less than 1,000 officers and men to Sinai. Clear enough, in that case Sinai would become yet another outpost of the US desiring to blockade the oil-rich Middle East regions on all sides, and, to gain another access to the Persian Gulf.

During its occupation of Sinai, Israel has managed to set up there such major air bases as Etzion and Eilat, and the naval base of Sharm-el-Sheikh, the latter keeping the Aqaba Bay under control. If these bases are put at US disposal, the Pentagon can exercise direct military control over a vast region in the Middle East and get transit routes for the mobile transfer of punitive units if the need to suppress the liberation movement in the area arises. One should add that in Egypt, the USA has already won proving grounds for manoeuvres and weapon tests.

The Pentagon shows a special craving for the Egyptian base of Ras Banas in the Red Sea, and the American press makes no bones about the fact that the Pentagon might use the bases in Egypt for mobile transfer of both US and NATO troops from Western Europe to the Persian Gulf area. Such plans have been discussed during NATO sessions. Noteworthy, the "rapid deployment force" units with their headquarters at the MacDill Air Force Base in Florida is to be put under the operational command of US General Rogers, NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. In essence, that would mean spreading the influence of the bloc over the entire Middle East.

The USA considers Britain its most reliable partner among the NATO members, and obviously not without reason. During her visit to Washington, Prime Minister Thatcher voiced a vigorous support of the idea of setting up the "rapid deployment force" and expressed readiness, on behalf of her country, to "make a contribution". According to estimates made by the US military staffs, a wide network of bases would allow the transfer of a whole landing corps to the Persian Gulf in a few days if a "state of emergency" were to arise.

Of late, the USA has done out of its way to talk Saudi Arabia into lending it bases and abandoning the all-Arab struggle against Israeli annexationism, offering it jet fighters and other hardware in exchange. Newsweek recently reported that the Pentagon is ready to rebuild and equip the air base at Dahrán, as well as other bases in Saudi Arabia, so that they could accommodate B-52 bombers.

The US intention to get hold of bases in the Middle East is obviously prompted by its desire to involve the countries of the region still deeper in its military schemes. With this aim in view, Washington readily lends money for the purchase of US armaments. Even more so: the armaments are followed by US advisers and technicians to train the local personnel to use the arms. In this manner, the Pentagon tries to control foreign armies, turning them into its mercenaries.

The US is exploiting the regimes dependable on it in all sorts of machinations. Sadat, who became Washington's obedient servant, is not the only example. The US sets the Sultan of Oman off against neighbouring Democratic Yemen, spurs Somalia to continue its conflict with Ethiopia, makes Israel kindle the flames of war in Lebanon, and encourages South Africa's aggressive actions against its neighbours in every possible way. Simultaneously it is hatching ideas for the formation of another military bloc in the Middle East, to replace the defunct CENTO, with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Somalia as probable members.

The USA is doing its utmost to gain access to the ports of several other countries in the Indian Ocean for its warships. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are being subjected to such solicitation. Since the time of undeclared war against Afghanistan, Pakistan has enjoyed special US patronage. During the recent visit of Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, to Washington, a plan was worked out on the renewal of the US arms deliveries to the country and the granting of \$2.5 billion over a period of five years, for the re-equipment and modernisation of the Pakistani army. Washington is counting on Islamabad to become the successor to the overthrown regime of the Shah in Iran, in other words, to be a gendarme in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. It goes without saying that the USA has laid down a number of conditions in exchange for military aid to Pakistan of which the press makes no secret. Business Week wrote that the Pentagon was seeking free access to the port of Karachi for its aircraft carriers and warships. The American press hints at US readiness to lend a helping hand to build a port in Gwadar, the Arabian Sea, that could be later on turned into a naval base. The USA is also trying to acquire the right to use the air base in Baluchistan for its stopover landings.

US representatives drop hints to their Pakistani colleagues that if such concessions are made, the USA will turn a blind eye on Islamabad's nuclear bomb project. The US Congress lobby has already emasculated (since they are unable to abrogate it) the Symington-Glenn amendment prohibiting the sale of US arms to Pakistan unless the latter gives up its nuclear ambitions.

US warships' visits to Singapore and the ports of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have become frequent of late. Taking into account the fact that the US possesses the large naval base at Subic Bay and Clark Field air base in the Philippines, it becomes clear that actually all the ASEAN member states are of keen interest to the United States.

It is obvious that the Pentagon is eager to blockade the straits connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, where the USA has long since had a wide network of bases on the Japanese Islands, in South Korea and Micronesia. There are US bases on Guam and Kwajalein, Saipan and Tinian wherefrom the bombers that dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had flown. Many of these bases have been turned into storage places for nuclear weaponry in addition to some 2,500 nuclear warheads carried by US ships patrolling the seas washing Asia and Africa.

One cannot ignore the fact that the Pentagon has long

been at home in Australia, where it has bases at Cockburn Sound Bay, the Northwest Cape, and in Darwin.

Two US aircraft carrier units have "stoppered up" the Hormuz Strait, the outlet from the Persian Gulf. US bases also "guard" the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which leads from the Red Sea. The Pentagon is scheming to place another naval task force under the South Atlantic Command, at the southernmost point of Africa. To control the Malacca Strait and the sea routes between Indonesia and Australia is another cherished hope of US admirals.

There are more than strategic reasons involved here. About 800 million tons of oil are shipped annually via Persian Gulf routes. The Hormuz Strait is the route along which the tankers carry 60 per cent of the oil consumed by Western Europe, 90 per cent of what goes to Japan, and 20 per cent of that which goes to the USA. The Indian Ocean ports handle about a quarter of all the cargoes in world trade. Therefore, control over these major sea routes would allow the USA to control both the Middle East oil-producing countries and those that use that oil.

There is no doubt that, no matter what pretexts US diplomacy proffers, US military preparations in the Indian Ocean are not in the interests of peace. That is why US actions evoke protests from many littoral states. Indian Foreign Minister Narsimha Rao noted for example, that his country had notified Washington of the grave concern over US actions in militarising the Indian Ocean. The Indian Foreign Ministry report, made public of late, emphasised: "A situation threatening peace is obtaining in the Indian Ocean, where the tension is growing due to the extension of the Diego Garcia US base, which has been turned into a nuclear arsenal."

US spokesmen's assertions that American war preparations serve to defend the peoples in that area from the mythical "Soviet menace", are not believed either in Asia or in Africa. The nations in both continents know that the Soviet Union is a true friend of the newly-free countries, their dependable ally in the struggle against imperialism. Therefore, the assertions sometimes voiced that tensions surrounding the Indian Ocean are evoked by "rivalry between the two superpowers" are untenable. In contrast to the USA, the Soviet Union does not covet foreign riches, neither does it strive for concessions, or makes investments to gain profits by exploiting other countries' natural or labour power resources. Economic cooperation between

the USSR and Asia and Africa is selfless, equitable and mutually beneficial; its main concern is to assist young states in creating conditions for their economic independence from foreign monopolies.

In contrast to the USA, the Soviet Union has no military bases in the Indian Ocean; neither does it have any desire for them. Its policy lines are honest and open. The Soviet Union fully supported the idea of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, put forward by a number of coastal states, back in 1971. Moreover, it made timely and important proposals towards the achievement of that goal.

The USSR also put forward concrete proposals concerning the settlement of the Persian Gulf situation. During his visit to India in December 1980, Leonid Brezhnev set forth a five-point programme on that score which evoked a great deal of interest in Asia and Africa and, according to Afrique-Asie, met with understanding and support there. This programme was approved by the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communists who expressed their readiness to discuss the international aspects of the Afghan problem in connection with security in the Persian Gulf. This new initiative, prompted by goodwill, is disarming those who want to justify the unrestrained buildup of military power using Afghanistan as a pretext. Besides, it demonstrates the flexible, constructive nature of Soviet foreign policy, in which peace is a paramount condition for the free and sovereign development of all the countries and peoples.

The 26th CPSU Congress also proposed a comprehensive programme of normalising the situation in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. On the whole, the Soviet Union has steadily adhered to the point of view, clear to every objective-minded person, that the arms race or stepped-up rivalry will never bring peace to Asia. Security in the region cannot be obtained by balancing between the "poles of force" which it has become so fashionable to discuss in Western capitals of late. It is noteworthy that the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, supported by 130 UN member countries, included such provisions as the need to dismantle foreign military bases in the area, to stop the arms race, to create universal collective security excluding any military alliances whatever.

Genuine peace and security can be ensured by concerted effort of all countries on the basis of coordinated common measures on disarmament. The dismantling of foreign military bases is one of the most crucial and urgent of all such measures. ■

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ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATS POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

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[Article by: Vladimir Bushin: "Moving Forward or Marking Time?"]

[Text]

The stand of international social democracy on the struggle against apartheid and colonialism and its evolution has been examined in this journal more than once. The lives of the peoples in Southern Africa were rich in events in recent times. The people of Zimbabwe have thwarted plans to install a puppet regime in their country and gained independence. The Namibian patriots headed by SWAPO are waging a successful struggle for freedom. A fresh upsurge in the revolutionary movement can be observed in South Africa where daring operations by guerillas of the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC) - *Umkhonto we Sizwe*—are coupled with strike action and youth unrest.

It is apparently high time to take another look at the policy of international social democracy in Southern Africa in order to try to find out whether the gap between its words and deeds has narrowed.

It shall be recalled that a mission from the Socialist International led by its Vice-President Olof Palme made a tour of African frontline states in September 1977. The report presented by the mission contained specific proposals which were soon approved as a *Programme of Action in Southern Africa* at the session of the Bureau of the Socialist International in Madrid, and its Secretariat was instructed to maintain contacts with the member parties for its implementation. The *Programme of Action*, which is still the basic document of the social democrats on Southern Africa includes the following provisions: 1. putting an end to all exports of arms to South Africa and all cooperation with its government in the military field, opposing the transfer of strategic, including nuclear, technology to South Africa; 2. banning fresh investments and export of capital to South Africa and Namibia, seeking support for proposals on such a ban in the UN Security Council as the minimum which can be expected from the Western governments; 3. broadening of aid to the frontline states; 4. political and material aid "for peaceful purposes" to the ANC, SWAPO and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front; 5. aiding the victims

of apartheid, in particular, through the channels of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, The International University Exchange Fund, and the UN Special Fund for Southern Africa; 6. assisting regional cooperation between the independent African states; 7. putting an end to the "flow of mercenaries" to countries with racist regimes; 8. strengthening the movement of solidarity for the liberation of Southern Africa, holding a national solidarity campaign within each party; 9. governmental aid to public movements in support of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

In the first place, it must be pointed out that this programme does not include some of the national liberation movements' major demands. It does not contain a single word in support of the perpetual demand of the freedom fighters for the isolation of racist regimes. The proposals of the Socialist International in the economic field are very limited: they do not envisage the cessation, or at least a reduction, of trade with South Africa, withdrawal of capital already invested there (unlike, for example, the programme of the World Council of Churches). Neither is any mention made of an oil embargo which could essentially weaken the military punitive machinery of the racists.

As before, the Socialist International has not expressed explicit support for the armed struggle of the patriots of Southern Africa. True, the report by the Palme mission mentioned the necessity of supporting the struggle of the African people on its own terms, but this statement was not included into the *Programme of Action*. On the contrary, as we have already seen, it stipulates assistance to the liberation movements "for peaceful purposes only".

Now let us see what actual measures for its implementation have been taken by the social democratic parties, to what measure they could influence the governments of the Western countries as regards the isolation of the racist regimes and mobilise public forces in support of the freedom fighters.

Even after the UN Security Council imposed, in 1977, the mandatory em-

bargo on the supply of arms and military equipment to the apartheid state. South Africa spends at least 25 per cent of its incessantly growing military budget on purchases abroad, including purchases from the countries where parties and members of the Socialist International are in power.¹ Thus, for example, the British Plessey not only sells South Africa electronic aircraft guidance equipment, but also trains personnel for the South African Air Force on British territory. The then Labour government did not object to the company's activity. The government continued leasing oil storage tanks at the Simonstown naval base from the South African authorities and regularly replenishing oil supplies by means of auxiliary vessels of the Royal Navy. A. McGiven, a former agent of the South African BOSS secret police told the London *Observer* that the intelligence services of Britain and South Africa maintained contacts under the Labour government.²

When the government of the FRG tried to get rid of the South African military attache in Bonn, the South African press assessed it merely as "part of its plan to eliminate the visible signs of close relations with Pretoria in the military field". As for the invisible, or to be more precise, carefully concealed "signs of friendship in the military field", quite a lot were named at the *Congress Against Nuclear Cooperation Between the FRG and South Africa* which was convened in Bonn on the initiative of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and other public organisations in that country.³ The government was forced to issue a special booklet under the pretentious title *Facts v. Fiction*, which, according to Ms Ingeborg Wick, Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, was a set of "half-truths and distortions". In the paper *A Reply to the Denial by the Government of the FRG*, the opponents of apartheid cited numerous fresh facts, such as supplies of large quantities of weapons and ammunition to South Africa from the Bundeswehr's ammunition depots with the assistance of the federal intelligence service, continued supplies of equipment for uranium enrichment plants, financing by government agencies of West German nuclear researchers' voyages to South Africa, etc. The supplement contained more than 120 pages of photocopies of documents

which the Anti-Apartheid Movement had at its disposal.

Trade between South Africa and the Western countries in which social democrats are in power is developing rapidly. As Austria's trade representative of Pretoria Puxkandal emphasised, Austria's efforts are directed at selling sophisticated production, advanced technology, and new systems of equipment, and concluding license contracts with local companies.⁴ In fact, Austria supplied South Africa with sophisticated equipment for nuclear plants. According to reports in the South African press, South Africa makes broad use of Vienna as a base for the development of its trade with West European countries.

From 1976 to 1979, Denmark's purchases of coal in South Africa grew a hundred fold (sic). Reporting on this rapid increase, the Johannesburg *Star* mentioned that this was done notwithstanding the active (in words.—V. B.) anti-South African stand of the Danish government.

The FRG maintains diverse economic ties with South Africa. Although the mission of the Socialist International, which drafted the *Programme of Action*, included noted SPD figure Holtz, the Party's Board has actually dissociated itself from a number of its provisions. In March 1978, it issued a statement on the occasion of the International Anti-Apartheid Year but made no mention of support for the ANC and SWAPO, and instead of putting an end to capital investments, it stated only a possible cut in export credits.

But the FRG's exports to South Africa and the flow of imports in the opposite direction, far from declining, continue to grow at an exceptionally high rate (in 1979 trade grew 50 per cent; a similar tendency was also observed in 1980). The FRG motivates its opposition to the economic sanctions by the UN against South Africa "by the destructive effect of the possible discontinuation of South African raw material supplies on West Germany's industry". But as a matter of fact, the point at issue is not so much the threat of a raw material shortage for the FRG as its active penetration to South Africa's markets. The scale of this penetration is seen from the fact that 6,000 West German firms, many of which serve the racist war machinery, have representatives in South Africa.

The Deimler-Benz company has given the South African Government Corporation for Industrial Development an opportunity to start the manufacture of a new type of diesel engines simultaneously with the start of

¹ UN Centre Against Apartheid. *Notes and Documents*, 24/27, September 1979, p. 1.

² See *Observer*, Jan. 27, 1980.

³ See *Documentation. Congress Against Nuclear Cooperation Between FRG and SA*. Bonn, 1979.

⁴ See *Star*, Johannesburg, April 24, 1979.

their production in the FRG. The Volkswagen concern together with the Royal-Dutch Shell corporation and the South African chemical giant AESI are taking part in a project to design an engine burning methanol, a fuel extracted from low quality grades of coal, in which South Africa is rich. Thus, the above-said firms directly assist the Pretoria authorities in lessening the consequences of the oil embargo imposed by the majority of petroleum exporting countries.

But how do things stand with the prohibition of investments and export of capital to South Africa envisaged in the *Programme of Action* of the Socialist International?

A law to this effect was adopted only in Sweden in 1979, three years following its being suggested by the leader of Sweden's Social Democratic Party Olof Palme, after it had already given up the reins of government to coalition of bourgeois parties. But why was such an important initiative not implemented for such a long time? The causes of this delay were elucidated by the pro-governmental Johannesburg newspaper *Citizen*. This well-informed mouthpiece of racist propaganda wrote that pending that move, the Swedish firms had made all the necessary capital investments.

At any rate it must be noted that Swedish capital investments in South Africa are insignificant. The sponsors of the law regarded it as an example for other Western states. Alas, none of South Africa's economic partners has followed this example in the two years since. In spite of resistance by the former leadership of the Labour Party, in particular David Owen, a resolution demanding an end to capital investments in South Africa was carried by a Labour conference, but again only after the Labour Party found itself in opposition.

It must be noted that, in Sweden, too, matters do not stand well with the implementation of the law prohibiting capital investments. It was pointed out at the International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa (Paris, May 20-27, 1981) that, the volume of Sweden's capital investments in South Africa in 1980, which were authorised as an exception, exceeded their annual volume before the adoption of the law.

After the tour of Africa's frontline states by the Olof Palme mission, the Socialist International and the parties incorporated into it began to strive to broaden ties with those states. Some social democratic governments granted loans to finance projects in Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. But this aid was not related to the main thing—defence of frontline states from the aggressive actions of the racials. True, when Zambia became

a target of brigand attacks by the racist military in 1978, the British government proclaimed from roof tops on rendering urgent military aid to Zambia, including, among other things, the supply of radar equipment and anti-aircraft weapons. Addressing the 14th Congress of the Socialist International, R. Kamanga, M. CC of Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party shed some light on the facts which preceded that move: "Zambia started negotiations with Britain and other countries... to purchase equipment several months ago, but this was not in any way connected with the recent aggression of the (Rhodesian) rebels. But Britain was marking time and announced its positive response only now, thus creating an impression that it is defending us against the Smith regime."⁵ It must be added that Zambia did not have skilled personnel to use the British equipment and it played practically no role in repelling the racist aggression.

The Socialist International also makes considerable effort, to strengthen contacts with the national liberation movements. But on this issue, too, its line is quite controversial. In a congratulatory telegramme addressed to Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, the leadership of the Socialist International emphasized that the organisation had long supported the struggle for Zimbabwe's independence. *Socialist Affairs* pledged support for the Patriotic Front in its editorial article, calling it the true representative of the Zimbabwe people.⁶

But let us recall the facts. When the Rhodesian racist leader Ian Smith announced the "unilateral declaration of independence", the British Labour government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson which was in power in Britain at that time, failed to take any serious measures against the unlawful regime. In the course of the years of armed struggle by the Zimbabwe patriots against the racist regime, the then Labour Party leadership never expressed support for it, to say nothing of specific aid to the freedom fighters.

All true friends of Zimbabwe welcomed with profound satisfaction the news of the establishment of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, which united the ZANU and ZAPU parties. But the Socialist International was in no hurry to determine its stand.

The Socialist International clearly expressed its support of the Front for

⁵ *Socialist International Congress*, Vancouver, Nov. 3-5, 1978, "Speech by the Hon. R. C. Kamanga", M. C. C., United National Independence Party, Zambia", p. 3.

⁶ See *Socialist Affairs*, 1980, No. 2, p. 87.

the first time only a year later, after Olof Palme's tour of the frontline states. But the double game continued. Thus, the British Labour government of James Callaghan established contacts with the Smith-Muzorewa regime and agreed to send parliamentary observer for the "elections" sponsored by the racists in April 1979.

The meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International which was held in Lisbon in October 1979 openly called into question the necessity of supporting the Patriotic Front. The publication of the Socialist International pointed out that it could not be said that the then government of Zimbabwe—the Bishop Abel Muzorewa administration—was totally without friends [at the Bureau Session.—V. B.]. It also noted that some voices coming from the USA proved that it deserved more support and attention than was expressed in the speeches. Characteristically it also mentioned that it was difficult to judge whether that viewpoint was shared by all the participants in the session.⁷ Thus, the point at issue was by no means "political, humanitarian and material aid" to the Patriotic Front, as was envisaged by the *Programme of Action* of the Socialist International, but whether the participants in the session of the Bureau were "completely" and "all" ready to give "more support and attention" to the puppet Muzorewa regime.

More than once the SWAPO leadership had to strongly criticise the activity of the so-called "contact group" of the five Western powers on Namibia in which social democratic governments also took part.

A dual stand is also taken by some social democratic circles vis-à-vis the Bantustans which have been set up by the South African authorities. While condemning their establishment by word of mouth, at the same time they made contacts directly with the authorities of the Bantustans. Thus, after his trip to the FRG "Prime Minister" of Transkei, J. Matanzima declared that he had had talks with leading MPs from government and opposition parties and negotiated the development of trade between Transkei and the FRG. There is an unofficial representation of another Bantustan—Bophuthatswana—in West Germany.

Although the SPD leadership and leaders of a number of other parties gave consent to the opening of an ANC representation in Bonn and declared that it is important to maintain contacts with the South African opposition, they are incessantly continuing their search for more "moderate" opposition elements, that could make up a so-called "third force" between the racialists and freedom fighters.

⁷ See *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1979, p. 16.

A fresh move in that direction was the invitation extended to chief Buthelezi, head of the administration of the Kwazulu Bantustan, the leader of the Inkatha organisation he set up, to visit Strasbourg in the Autumn of 1980 as a guest of the "Socialist group" of the European parliament. In spite of objections from a number of socialist deputies, the visit was held precisely at the time when Buthelezi came out against the boycott of the racist education system in South Africa and refused to support the campaign for the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela. Buthelezi willingly used the rostrum of the European parliament to slander the ANC.

The duplicity of the policy of international social democracy in Southern Africa was also manifest in the activity of the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), which was described in the *Programme of Action* of the Socialist International as one of the channels for the flow of aid to the victims of apartheid.

The administration of the Fund, in which the key posts were held by social democrats, recognised the ANC as the leading liberation organisation of South Africa. But irreparable damage was done to the prestige of the Fund by the exposure of Craig Williamson, a South African spy, who held the post of IUEF deputy director, and the sordid facts which were brought to light in this connection. As a result the Fund was closed early in 1981.

It was established that the Fund had been used to support splitter, anti-communist groupings in South Africa. Thus the British newspaper *Observer* quoted former agent of the South African police McGiven as saying that there was a secret banking account in Liechtenstein where money raised by IUEF for the "victims of apartheid" was transferred and then used for financial aid to the so-called Pan-African Congress (PAC) and a group of renegades who were expelled from the ANC.⁸ In connection with the exposure of Craig Williamson, the ANC issued a statement stressing the necessity of closer and fairer cooperation from organisations giving aid to the liberation movement.

Thus, on the whole the policy of international social democracy in the South of Africa is characterised as before by the striving, on the one hand, to develop ties with the forces of national liberation, and on the other hand, to maintain contacts with the racist regimes and to search for "moderate" forces that would secure the West's interests in case these regimes collapse. This was again borne out at the recent 15th Congress of the Socialist Interna-

⁸ *Observer*, Jan. 27, 1980.

tional in Madrid. Unlike the *Programme of Action* of 1977, which provides for assistance to specific national liberation movements in Southern Africa, the resolution of the Congress contains a provision of work with *all elements* [my italics.—V. B.] of the South African resistance movement, especially with the ANC and SWAPO. In fact, other forces, for example, the trade union organisations—SACTU in South Africa and NUNN in Namibia—act in close contact with the ANC and SWAPO. But the authors of the resolution hardly meant them. This is seen in particular from the fact that a representative of the Black Consciousness Movement was invited to attend the Congress along with representatives of the ANC. But the former movement has never existed in South Africa as an established organisation, and now its name is used in the West by individual emigres who oppose the ANC's political line.

At the same time, as was the case in the past, there are some distinctions between the stands of individual social-democratic parties, which are in large measure determined by the economic interests of some country or other in Southern Africa. For example, here is the reaction of one of the SPD figures to statements by the leader of the Swedish social-democratic party in support of the *Programme of Action* in the South of Africa: Olof Palme may enumerate the opportunities for specific actions as much as he pleases, but it is no easy thing to implement them for the countries which have capital investments in South Africa.*

While declaring political support for the national liberation movement, the social democrats try to hold them back from resolute actions and to sidetrack them into positions of reformism. Thus, W. Roth, Chairman of the Commission for the Development of the SPD, in his article published in *Socialist Affairs*, came out against the policy of the ANC, stating his opposition to any settlement in South Africa other than peaceful, thus trying to intimidate the freedom fighters and their allies in Africa with the inevitable sacrifices and the might of the South African army (which, it should be recalled once again, was equipped with the FRG's assistance). W. Roth wrote that a civil war, or, as he put it, the rebellion of the underprivileged in South Africa, would mean suicide for the biggest part of the active population and that "South Africa will not be saved from outside but only by peaceful change" from within.¹⁰

But this stand is by no means shared by all social democrats. In a letter addressed to the editorial board of *Socialist Affairs*, one of its readers justly noted that freedom in Zimbabwe did not come through elections, but had been won in a long armed struggle. In his opinion, in order to contribute towards eliminating apartheid, the West should first make real sacrifices, namely, end all ties with the South African government and economy. This must be followed by direct support for liberation movements in the form of supplies of food, medicines and then weapons.¹¹

The policy of the then Labour leadership on the problems of Southern Africa was strongly criticised at the Labour Party annual conference in 1980. The delegates expressed concern over what was described as a low level of support for the national liberation movement and advised the new National Executive Committee to hold consultations with the ANC to draw up and implement proposals on practical means of support.

The Socialist International and the parties affiliated with it are manoeuvring, on the one hand, under pressure from the radical forces both in the social democratic movement and outside it, and on the other hand, in a large measure because they fear a further rapprochement between forces of national liberation and world socialism. The striving of the social democrats to maintain and strengthen their positions in the independent African countries, which are highly sensitive to the West's cooperation with the racist regimes, is also being felt.

The words "turning point" can be frequently seen in articles and speeches by social democratic leaders on the problems of Southern Africa. This is how they described the 13th (Geneva) Congress of the Socialist International, the Olof Palme mission to the "frontline" states, and the session of the Bureau of the Socialist International in Lisbon (1979).

But turns, even in the right direction, cannot lead anywhere by themselves. Movement forward and specific actions are necessary. Otherwise any turns boil down to marking time....

* *Socialist Affairs*, No. 1, 1979, p. 22.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1979, p. 169.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 2, 1980, p. 52.

CHAD'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE OUTLINED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 5, Sep-Oct 81 pp 20-22

[Article by Pavel Fyodorov: "Situation in Chad"]

[Text]

The Republic of Chad, located in the centre of the African continent, is going through a crucial period in its history. After many years of acute domestic crisis which turned into a civil war, and the victory of the progressive patriotic forces, the people of Chad have finally got down to peaceful construction, continuing the struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and reaction, for the consolidation of independence.

Since the record of the current developments in Chad is well known, we shall give only a brief account of it.

In 1960, France was forced to decolonise Chad - the same as its other African possessions. The former "mother country" passed the power over to François Tombalbaye, who was born in the relatively developed southern area of the country, and was a pliant political leader. The policy of subordination to neocolonialism which he pursued, his inability and unwillingness to solve complex socio-economic problems, indifference to the interests of the northern and eastern areas, and cruel repressions, including assassination, of non-conformists, resulted in the emergence of a large-scale opposition movement. From 1966 it was led by the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) which launched a successful armed struggle against the regime. The latter could not be saved even by the direct French military aid begun in 1969.

In April 1975, the Tombalbaye government, which had fully discredited itself, was overthrown as a result of a coup staged by General Malloum. The situation, however, did not change at all. Moreover, the condition of the masses deteriorated. By the middle of 1978, FROLINAT detachments reached the town of Njamena, the country's capital.

A specific feature of the insurgent movement in Chad, inhabited by more than 140 nationalities, was the great number of militarised groups formed mainly on the tribal and religious basis. External and internal reaction actively used this to split the movement, seeking to replace its desire for national liberation by a power struggle between different groupings. The progressive wing of the FROLINAT leadership under Oueddei Goukouni, who at that time was the leader of the people's armed forces (FAP), came out with a broad democratic programme for the renovation of Chad, for equal rights and opportunities for the entire population irrespective of ethnic origin and religion, whereas the Armed Force of the North group which split off from the front and was led by Hissène Habré, enjoyed help of the West and Arab reaction.

Malloum offered Habré premiership, while remaining President of the country himself. Their alliance proved shortlived, because each of them claimed to be in charge. In February 1979, an armed conflict flared up between the

participants in the "alliance". The forces of FROLINAT under the command of Ouedei Goukouni, supported by a number of other military political groupings, entered Njamena. The Malloum regime was toppled and the remnants of the government troops retreated to southern provinces. By that time there were already eleven groupings in Chad. The largest of them had their own armed forces and claimed to be in charge of the country which was actually split. Growing dislocation and constant interference of imperialist powers and Arab reactionaries into the internal affairs of Chad further aggravated the crisis situation.

A conference was convened in August 1979 in Lagos under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity, attended by representatives of neighbouring and some other African countries and all the military-political groupings of Chad. They worked out an agreement which provided for the formation of a transitional government of national unity, the holding of universal elections within the next 18 months, demilitarisation of Njamena, and withdrawal of French troops from Chad. This agreement was adopted on the initiative of FROLINAT in spite of resistance put up by Habré.

Although FROLINAT enjoyed predominant influence in the country, Ouedei Goukouni, who by that time headed the transitional government, included representatives of all groupings in it, in accordance with the Lagos agreement and in the interest of national conciliation. Habré was appointed Minister of Defence.

The government put forward a programme of democratisation of socio-political life, achievement of genuine unity, and restoration of economy. Objective prerequisites were created for the implementation of this programme by the victory of the insurgent forces led by FROLINAT which had long fought against neocolonialism and its stooges. However, when it became clear that Ouedei Goukouni and his supporters among the progressive forces intended to pursue an independent domestic and foreign policy and consolidate FROLINAT by means of uniting other groupings around it on an anti-imperialist platform, and to extend Chad's contacts with African states of progressive orientation, imperialist powers hastened to destabilise situation in the country. They backed on Habré who was eager to take over, and began a revolt. In March 1980, the internecine war was again raging.

It is no accident that the imperialist powers show a special interest in Chad. One of the least developed countries in Africa, it has rich deposits of oil, uranium, and ores of non-ferrous and rare metals. Earlier, its economy was actually in the hands of Western monopolies. French capital virtually controlled all the leading branches, in particular cotton growing, the basis of the country's exports, and prospected for uranium and other solid mineral resources. As for the oil prospecting, it was captured by US capital. For example, from 1969 to 1979 US CONOCO company conducted geological surveying on an area of 300,000 sq km, a quarter of Chad's territory.

Besides, the geographic location of Chad attracts much attention from a military strategic point of view. Prior to May 1980 when France was compelled to withdraw its troops, Chad was regarded by French diplomats as one of the "mainstays" of the entire French policy in Africa.

In analysing the causes of and developments in the Chad crisis, one cannot but conclude that it could hardly become so protracted but for the interference of imperialist forces which are interested in keeping in power compliant statesmen who can be manipulated by western monopolies, and imposing neocolonial "patronage" on Chad.

It is no longer a secret that Western imperialist quarters gave every kind of support to Habré and encouraged Egypt, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia to render him financial and military aid. This is why the leaders of the majority

of the Chad groupings expressed their solidarity with Ouedei Goukouni and opposed the attempts of the rebellious minister, who, relying on domestic and foreign reaction, sought to frustrate the implementation of the Lagos agreement and stage a coup.

The hostilities launched by Habré against the troops of the government coalition lasted for about nine months, raging mainly in Njamena and areas north and east of it. The majority of buildings in the capital were destroyed, and water and energy supplies were put out of order. Thousands of people perished, many thousands were wounded, and more than one hundred thousand fled to neighbouring Cameroun and Nigeria.

The situation in Chad could not but cause grave concern among the majority of African states which favoured a settlement of the crisis by the people of Chad with the help and support of Africans. This position was reiterated at the extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU countries in Lagos (April 1980) and at the Seventeenth Session of the Assembly in Freetown (July 1980). African states recognised Ouedei Goukouni as the legitimate leader of Chad. The proposal to enlist UN armed forces to bring about a settlement in the country, which was obviously inspired by Western quarters, was rejected by the government of Chad which stressed the inadmissibility of the internationalisation of the conflict, and also by a number of African states whose leaders remember only too well the lessons of the Congolese crisis of 1960-1961.

Acting within the framework of the OAU, African countries continued their efforts to achieve a ceasefire. In mid-October 1980, on their initiative, a meeting between Ouedei Goukouni and Hissène Habré was organised in Lomé, the capital of Togo. At the end of November 1980, the OAU proposed a draft agreement on a ceasefire throughout the whole of Chad by 15 December 1980. Goukouni displayed goodwill and signed the agreement, while Habré turned it down.

Still it was precisely by the 15th of December that a radical change occurred in the developments in Chad: the government coalition troops captured Njamena. The victory was made possible after the coalition, relying on support from Libya with which Chad had concluded a treaty of cooperation in June 1980, succeeded in cutting the supply routes by which Habré obtained military hardware and munitions from Egypt and the Sudan. His detachments, which existed only due to external aid, dispersed and he fled the country. The reactionary rebellion which was aimed at compelling the patriotic forces to surrender proved a fiasco.

The discontinuation of hostilities opened up the way for the people of Chad to achieve cohesion and to move toward genuine normalisation of the situation, political stability, and peaceful construction to restore the independent state of Chad. All this was undoubtedly in the interests of peace and security in the whole Central African region.

However, such an outcome of the conflict in Chad was far from being to everyone's liking. Habré's defeat triggered another round of political combinations and behind-the-scenes manoeuvring by reactionary Arab and African forces acting on the orders of the NATO countries. Proposals were made to include Habré in the provisional government, to send so-called "neutral" armed forces into Chad, to examine the non-existent "Chad question" in the UN, and so on.

Seeking to avert complication of the situation which had taken shape in and around the country, the government of Chad decided to attend the meeting of thirteen African countries on national conciliation in Chad, a meeting which had been planned even prior to the defeat of Habré. It took place late in December 1980 in Lagos.

In response to the attempts by reactionary forces to impose a plan of "settlement" on them which would have been to the liking of the West, representatives of Chad proposed discussion of concrete ways of working towards national reconstruction of the country and stressed that the question of the ceasefire was no longer on the agenda. Commenting on the results of the conference, the French *L'Humanité* wrote that some circles had planned, with the aid of palais de l'Élysée to turn the meeting into an instrument of war against the legitimate government of Chad, whose "fault" was that after the defeat of the detachments led by former Defence Minister Hissène Habré, it established control over the country. According to the designs of these circles, the paper went on, the conference was supposed to censure Ouedei Goukouni and his allies and to impose on them the military presence of some countries in Chad under the control of the French government.

These attempts were rejected, primarily by Nigeria, Benin, the Congo and Libya. As a result, the conference issued an appeal to refrain from interference in Chad's affairs, recommended that Ouedei Goukouni hold universal elections no later than January 1982, decided to convene an all-Africa conference on rendering aid to Chad, and asked the United Nations and the entire world community to support the government of Chad in implementing a programme of restoration.

Thus, the developments in Chad showed once again that the Organisation of African Unity, under the impact of its progressive majority, is able to play a positive role in settling disputes and conflicts in Africa, and can efficiently counter the neocolonialist policy of Western powers.

Libya's assistance and support of the legitimate government of Ouedei Goukouni proved a decisive factor in the restoration of peace in Chad. In a bid to achieve further rapprochement, Chad and Libya published a communiqué signed in Tripoli in January 1981 on their intention to take steps towards attaining unity between the two countries. It was also reported that a limited military contingent would be sent to Chad, and that Libya would assist in restoring the former's economy. The communiqué contained the important statement that Libya and Chad resolutely favour popular struggles for independence, against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The release of this document, which dealt with relations between two sovereign states, caused a sharply negative reaction from the imperialist powers and some African countries of pro-Western orientation (Egypt, the Sudan, and so on). They sought to prove that the statement on Chad-Libyan rapprochement was tantamount to the "annexation" of Chad by Libya and posed a "threat" to neighbouring states. The European Parliament even went so far as to try to intimidate the government of Chad by a possible cut-off of economic ties between the EEC and Chad if the latter continued to consolidate its friendly relations with Libya. The new US Administration crudely reprimanded Chad too. The Western mass media launched an anti-Libyan—anti-Chad propaganda campaign which, as is usual in such cases, was supported by Peking.

Under these conditions, the government of Chad gave an explanation of its policy. The government's statement of 15 January 1981 pointed out that it was not a plan for unification which was meant, but actually, the statement went on, the two sides simply stated their intentions: the unification of the two countries can be achieved only as a result of free expression of will of the two peoples. The statement also emphasised that this question can be examined only after the holding of free democratic elections in Chad. The Libyan leaders gave similar explanations. The two sides also pointed out that the limited Libyan military personnel is stationed in Chad at the request of

Njamena and will be withdrawn if Chad so desires. The presence of this personnel in Chad poses no threat to other countries.

These statements made known the true situation. However, Egypt, the Sudan and some Western circles continue attacks against Chad and Libya. It is indicative that the representatives of reactionary Arab and African circles and the press in the NATO countries which approve the sending of the former mother-country's troops to the borders of Chad are raising hue and cry about the "illegitimate" nature of the Libyan assistance.

Let us note that the initiators of this propaganda campaign, in particular the Western press, first called directly on France to stage an armed intervention in Chad. Then they stated that if France did not interfere in Chad's affairs, then African countries would have to rely on the US military "umbrella", which is allegedly more effective than the French one. In other words, they openly favoured the military expansion of the USA into Africa.

After the failure of the designs for a military intervention in Chad, the imperialist circles staked their bets on the artificial political isolation of Chad and Libya in Africa. These circles and their stooges are trying to put the non-existent "Chad question" on the agenda of broad international forums. While distorting the character of the assistance given by Libya to the legitimate government of Chad, they pass over in silence the fact that it was rendered in conformity with a bilateral agreement which in no way contradicts either the UN Charter or the Charter of the OAU. The fact that it was precisely the Chad-Libyan rapprochement that made it possible to restore peace in Chad, whose peoples had long suffered from a bloody and fratricidal war and that it was this agreement that promoted the normalisation of the situation in central Africa is deliberately ignored. That this rapprochement objectively meets the interests of the two countries because it may contribute to the resolution of the long-existing Chad-Libya territorial dispute, which obstructed the normal development of relations between the two neighbouring countries for many years, is ignored as well.

Closely coordinating their actions, Egypt and the Sudan still hope to galvanise the political line of Habré and bring him back to Chad. They also support his claim to power. Habré's detachments have rearmed on foreign territory and resumed military operations near the Chad-Sudanese border.

In commenting on Habré's trip to Egypt in February 1981 and his negotiations with Sadat, the Libyan paper *Al-Jamahiriyah* pointed out that the "main task of this visit is to prepare new atrocities against the people of Chad, new provocations against the peaceful population, and to unleash a new civil war. The Egyptian Intelligence services with the US Central Intelligence Agency behind them, which has created the biggest spy network in the Middle East in Egypt, are helping Habré in his provocative activity".

The situation in Njamena today is relatively calm, although the curfew has not been lifted. Work to restore the capital has begun, the immediate task being to build public facilities and provide the population with food. Refugees are flocking back to the city.

The Goukouni government has decided to set up a constitutional committee, a committee of national restoration, and a committee on the formation of the national army from troops of different groupings.

The people of Chad who opted for freedom and struggle against all forms of exploitation and imperialist oppression will have to overcome many dire consequences of the war and neocolonial domination. The government is tackling difficult problems connected with the completion of the process of the development of national independence, improvement of economic life, and state construction. The-

se tasks can be solved only if the domestic peace upon which the people of Chad are pinning all their hopes can be maintained.

Of course, such a prospect is not to the liking of Chad's enemies, the imperialists and neocolonialists. As was pointed out at the 26th Congress of Soviet communists, "the imperialists are displeased with the fact that the newly-free countries are consolidating their independence. In a thousand ways they are trying to tie these countries to themselves in order to deal more freely with their natural riches and to use their territory for their strategic designs. In so doing, they make extensive use of the old colonialist method of divide and rule."

There is hardly any other African country where the forces of domestic and foreign reaction have so openly used tribalism, which had been artfully whipped up back in colonial times, in their interests. While distorting the true meaning of the developments in Chad, these forces are trying to describe events as rivalry between different ethnic groups. In actual fact, Chad is witnessing the struggle against the forces of reaction, imperialism and neocolonialism.

Friendly relations have existed between the USSR and the Republic of Chad for more than a decade. The Soviet people look with respect upon the courageous struggle of the people of Chad to strengthen the independence of their country, against the attempts of imperialism and internal reaction which seek to impose a neocolonial order on Chad. The Soviet Union invariably favours Chad's unity and the peaceful solution of its problems by the people of that country without interference by imperialist forces.

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SOVIET, ALGERIAN COOPERATION HIGHLIGHTED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 5, Sep-Oct 81 pp 43-45

[Article by Alexei Zlatorunsky: "For a Better Life"]

[Text]

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (PDRA) is undoubtedly one of the most dynamically developing countries. It is a good example of how anti-colonial and anti-imperialist thinking, which emerged among the masses during the more than seven years of the national liberation war, has produced a consistent anti-imperialist foreign policy and a socialist-oriented domestic policy.

Within a historically short period the PDRA has managed to win considerable international prestige. A member of the UN, the nonaligned movement, the Organisation of African Unity, the Arab League and the National Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation, Algeria has consistently pursued progressive, anti-imperialist policies. As was reiterated in their joint statements and communiqués, the viewpoints of the USSR and the PDRA on the crucial international issues were either close, or common. Let us consider the dynamics of Algeria's development over the recent years.

GOALS AND GAINS

The country's National Charter approved by the June 27, 1976 referendum formalised Algeria's socialist orientation and its anti-imperialist foreign policy. The role of the National Liberation Front Party is to guide and mobilise the masses for the implementation of the aims of the revolution. The IVth Congress of the NLF Party held in January 1979 discussed the key issues of the party reconstruction, approved its Rules and formulated the basic norms of party life. Under its Rules, any Algerian citizen, who is not involved in the exploitation of someone else's labour, can be a member. The document stresses that the working people in town and country, servicemen, youth, and revolutionary patriotic elements are the driving force and social base of the revolution. Democratic centralism was promulgated

as the underlying principle. The Party General Secretary Chadli Benjedid told the IVth Congress that Algeria's choice of socialism was irrevocable and that the party would steadfastly lead the people along the way set forth in the National Charter.

On June 15, 1980 an extraordinary party congress went into session with 4,000 delegates focusing on economic and personnel problems, which resulted from Algeria's having entered a new stage of planned development. The country had already made significant gains in the building of national economy. A three-year development plan for 1967-1969 and two four-year plans spanning the 1967-1977 period were completed. The 1978-1979 period was considered a transitional one, by which time the new, five-year plan had been worked out in minutest detail. By the time of its formulation, the country had made marked gains in industrial, agricultural, and social development.

Since gaining its independence, Algeria has built 640 industrial projects and set up new industries such as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, engineering, petrochemistry, etc. By the time the second four-year plan was completed in 1978, the country had already produced 54 mln tons of oil, 15,000 million cu m of gas, built 3,100 tractors, 6,600 trucks and buses, and smelted 400,000 tons of steel. To be sure, this is still not enough to meet the country's needs, but it is something to build on. In addition, oil and gas export revenues enable considerable purchases of machinery from other countries. In 1980, for instance, the country bought 12,000 tractors and 1,100 harvesters. The manufacturing industry is rapidly picking up: its 1980 output was 11 per cent up on the previous year, and 180,000 new jobs were created in just one year, which is critical for a young developing state with a high population growth rate.

All the key sectors of industry (over 90 per cent) are state-owned.

The creation of an industrial base permitted the launching of an agrarian revolution. The emphasis was not simply on changing land-tenure rules but on reshaping entire everyday life patterns in the countryside. The peasants were allotted land requisitioned from big landowners, helped to adopt new, collective forms of land management, and the state gave extensive aid to the new collective farms.

Specially trained personnel were sent to the countryside. Cooperative members could now benefit from all types of social security such as free education, free health care, guaranteed pay, and a system of pensions. Of much importance was the creation of model "socialist villages", of which over 300 have been functioning. They have water, gas, electricity, schools, markets, shops, medical centres and inevitable cafes and mosques. In many areas peasants not only live in conditions approximating those in towns but are also trained in advanced methods of running collective farms.

It goes without saying that industrial development and the revolution in agriculture are not ends in themselves but aim at improving the standards of living of the masses, ensuring their right to work, education, free medical assistance, and housing. Let us consider the latter problem in greater detail.

Under colonial rule, most local people were employed in agriculture and the extraction industry. A cheap and oppressed labour guaranteed the extremely low cost of raw materials and agricultural produce, which were parasitically used by the industries of the colonial empire. Big cities were predominantly inhabited by the military, colonial officials, big employers, and traders.

The advent of independence tore down this structure. Most colonialists and their families left the country and many towns became deserted—but not for long. The vacuum was gradually filled by jobless former farm-hands, extraction industry labour, and soldiers returning from the wars of national liberation. As the process gained momentum, the urban housing problem grew ever more acute. To combat the shortage, on the outskirts of big towns construction of housing developments from whole building blocks was started. In 1979 a total of 50,000 families moved into new flats in towns or houses in the countryside as Algeria boosted its housing construction. Waste

land or unused spaces around big towns and industrial centres are gradually turning into big construction sites for new housing for the working people. Alongside the development of industry and agriculture, the plan gives special priority to the improvement of health care and education, combating inflation, and stabilising prices. "For a Better Life" is the motto of the current five-year development plan in Algeria.

But there are many obstacles in the way; aside from objective difficulties caused by persisting dependence of the Algerian economy on the capitalist market, and, consequently, its vulnerability to the latter's inherent inflation, slumps, and market vacillations, the country faces internal difficulties like the resistance of the forces of reaction, red tape, mismanagement, and graft.

ANTI-IMPERIALIST DRIVE IN THE FOREFRONT

This autumn Algeria will celebrate 19 years of UN membership. Throughout this period the republic, just as other progressive forces of international community, has been incessantly campaigning to turn this organisation into

a genuine advocate of peace, justice, and the interests of developing nations. Algeria is looked upon as one of the countries which vigorously oppose imperialism and neocolonialism, work for peace and social progress. Specifically, Algeria consistently comes out for a lasting international security, and for the spreading of détente to the regions of the world, including the Mediterranean. Algeria favourably reacted to the USSR's proposals put forth at the 35th UN General Assembly Session on reducing the military threat, and the programme for curbing the arms race outlined in the memorandum, "For Peace, Disarmament, and Guarantees of International Security". Speaking in the session's general debate, the Algerian delegate denounced attempts by imperialist circles to subvert peace and stressed the need for a return to the policy of détente and curbing the arms race.

Algeria is a vigorous champion of a drive for the reshaping of world economic relations on the basis of genuine equality and justice.

Let us specifically consider Algeria's stand on the Middle East problem and the national liberation movement. Algeria is one of the sponsors of the National Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation, which is in the forefront of Arab opposition to Egypt's

separatist, truckling policy. Alongside the other Front members—Syria, Libya, the Democratic Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organisation—Algeria rejects the Camp David deal between the US, Egypt and Israel and favours a comprehensive, just settlement of the Middle East problem, the elimination of the remnants of colonialism and all forms of racial oppression. It actively supports the Chilean patriots fighting against the bloody Pinochet junta and gives a broad and varied assistance to the fighting people of Palestine. Algeria is becoming ever more prominent in the nonaligned movement, with its representatives consistently backing the rallying of the movement on an anti-imperialist basis, and also resisting efforts by the US and its NATO allies to split the movement, and to push the nonaligned countries on the road of joining forces with the capitalist West.

FRUITFUL COOPERATION

The 26th CPSU Congress held in 1981 emphasised that the Soviet Union will consistently develop cooperation with liberated countries and promote the alliance of world socialism and national liberation movements. The development of relations between the USSR and Algeria is a striking confirmation of that line, as exemplified by the March 1981 visit to Algeria by a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, led by Sheral Rashidov, Alternate Member of the Politburo, First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, and by an official friendly visit to the USSR of the PDRA President, General Secretary of the NLF Party Chedli Benjedid in June 1981. The results of these visits showed both countries' desire to expand and deepen their cooperation.

The participants in the talks emphasised the importance of relations between the CPSU and the NLF Party and expressed their satisfaction with the high level of inter-party cooperation. Having profoundly examined the international situation, they expressed grave concern over the tensions growing in the world, and declared their resolve to promote a lasting peace and international security, consolidate detente and contribute to the discontinuation of the arms race. An accord had been achieved to exert every effort for the UN Second Special General Assembly on Disarmament (1982) to be a success.

The two sides displayed anew the identity of views on the situation in and ways of settling the Middle East conflict. A complete and unreserved solidarity of the Soviet Union and Algeria with the national liberation movements and their just struggle had been reaffirmed.

Soviet-Algerian cooperation is making confident headway. The Soviet-Algerian Standing Intergovernmental Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation set up 12 years ago supervises the work in this field, and this was stressed in the joint communique on the visit of President Chedli Benjedid to the USSR.

The El Hadjar iron-and-steel combine is the main cooperation project. Completed or under construction there are a converter shop, a wire shop, two coke-oven batteries and a blast furnace. When all these units are commissioned, Algeria will produce around 2 mln tons of steel, 1.2 mln tons of cast iron, and 540,000 tons of rolled metal a year; all in all, it will meet nearly 50 per cent of Algeria's metal requirements. A total of 20 dams have been designed for the countryside, and some of them have already been built. Prospective and exploitation drilling of water wells is being carried out in Sahara. The USSR helped build and operate a lead-and-zinc dressing factory in El Abed, mercury works Ismail, window glass factory in Oran, and a 55-megawatt-capacity power plant in Annaba.

Soviet specialists work in practically all sectors of the Algerian economy, shoulder to shoulder with the native population, among them oilmen and irrigators, geologists, engineers, doctors and teachers. Soviet geologists, for instance, helped discover deposits of barytes, iron ore, polymetals, tungsten, mercury, tin, etc. Several hundred of Soviet doctors working in Algeria hospitals provided urgent assistance to people of El Asman when it was hit by an earthquake. The Soviet Union also helped build the national institutes of oil, gas and chemistry in Algeria, a light industry institute, and a mining-and-metallurgy institute, which later became a department at Annaba University. Over 6,500 engineers and technicians graduated from these institutes.

Special vocational training centres have been set up for expert Soviet personnel to train skilled local workers. The centres have already graduated over 26,000 skilled personnel in diverse fields. A large number of Algerian

youth are studying in Soviet colleges and technical schools, and about 900 of them have graduated to date.

In December 1980, the 6th Session of the Standing Intergovernmental Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation was held in Moscow, which charted further prospects of this cooperation and specific projects that would be built with Soviet participation, including a 630 megawatt-capacity thermo-power station, a cement factory producing half a million tons of cement a year, a tungsten concentrating plant, and other projects. An agreement was also reached for a spare parts shop at the iron-and-steel works at El Hodjar to be built.

The commission also discussed possibilities of bilateral cooperation in the new industries, for instance, in the extension of the railway network in Algeria, building a gas pipeline, and improving water conservancy.

Given the wealth of experience Soviet specialists share with national personnel, Algeria requested that this type of cooperation be expanded. There are plans to set up a national institute of music, a school training water conservancy experts, as well as additional vocational training centres.

Public organisations in both countries have stepped up their cultural and artistic contacts, among them exchanges of films, TV and radio programmes, ensembles, and scientific delegations. A promising direction in promoting understanding between the Soviet and Algerian peoples are the regular "friendship weeks", which help both countries gain better knowledge of each other.

Assessing the Soviet-Algerian cooperation as a whole, President Chadli Benjedid wrote in a message to Leonid Brezhnev: "The active and multi-faceted cooperation that now exists between our countries, apart from promoting the well-being of our peoples, is a striking indication of our mutual desire for peace, progress and justice in the world."

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PRC'S EXPANSIONIST POLICIES IN ASIA ATTACKED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 5, Sep-Oct 81 pp 48-49

[Article by Nikolai Karinin, Boris Pavlov: "On the Road of Expansion"]

[Text]

Asia remains the main objective in Peking's expansionist plans. As Jawaharlal Nehru said nearly twenty years ago, China wanted its neighbours to be within its sphere of influence and to dominate Asia.

Peking has not stopped scheming against its southern neighbours and goes out of its way to achieve its hegemonistic goals.

Tibet figures prominently in the Peking strategists' policy of hegemonism. US author Amaury d'Riencourt who has been to Lhasa wrote in his book *Roof of the World. Tibet—Key to Asia* that the strategic possibilities of this huge natural fortress rising high up in the very heart of Asia, difficult to reach from the ground, are striking... From there, he added, any power would be able to control the centre of Asia if it created bases within an hour's flight time to Delhi. Tibet is also known as an ideal air-lift base, an ideal springboard for any major troop movements in Asia, etc., information which becomes particularly ominous if one familiarises oneself with the reports coming from that region.

Today Tibet is deluged by Chinese troops, while its able-bodied population, including women, are enlisted in a "people's militia". The *Christian Science Monitor* wrote recently that one out of every seven Tibetans is a soldier in the Chinese army. The people have to go through labour conscription. They are divided into teams which supply the army, engage in transporting weapons and ammunition, and act as repair teams and medical detachments. The construction of strategic highways, bridges and airports is in full swing, a fact which will enable Peking to transfer large military units from inner Tibet to the Indian borders within several hours.

The Indian *Organiser* magazine cited reports from Tibetan refugees that a system of electronic sound locators has been mounted in South-west Tibet. The most sophisticated electronic equipment has been installed on the highest mountain peaks. According to the same sources, long-

range guns capable of shelling the Indian border area of Darjeeling have been installed in the Chumbi valley bordering on Sikkim. Another evidence testifying to the fact that military construction in Tibet is of an offensive nature are reports on the creation of missile bases in its southern and western regions. The *Indian National Herald*, for example, wrote in October 1980 that 500-to-1500-mile range missiles spearheaded against India and Afghanistan have been deployed along the borders.

The Tibetan people have long since fallen victim to the great-power chauvinist policy of the Maoists who rudely violated the agreement signed between the PRC government and the Lhasa authorities in May 1950 which provided for the preservation of the autonomy of Tibet. The policy of suppressing the national consciousness of the Tibetans, elimination of their traditional socio-political institutions and, lastly, forced assimilation, brought about armed actions against the Chinese authorities in March 1959. Peking's cruel punitive operations resulted in an exodus of the population: Tibetan refugees rushed to Nepal, Bhutan, and India, the place to which Dalai Lama Agvang Lobsang Tenzing Djamtsö had also emigrated.

Indian public opinion and political circles denounce Peking's policy in Tibet. Meanwhile, the Maoists are striving to force the Indian government to restrict activities of Tibetan emigrants, which constitutes gross interference into the domestic affairs of India.

The intensified militarisation of Tibet aggravated the situation there still further. The administrative, political and other measures taken by the Chinese authorities testify to their fresh attempts to "Sinicise" that remote national region and turn it into a Chinese province, a long-cherished dream of the Chinese hegemonists.

The Tibetan people are not going to accept the Sinicisation of their country and stubbornly oppose the Maoist colonialists. For instance, the Congress of Tibetan Youth favours Tibet's complete independence from China and insists that Tibetan and Chinese authorities have direct con-

tacts to "solve the Tibetan problem".

Of late, Peking has openly sought "contact" with the Dalai Lama and other influential Tibetan emigrants in hope of heightening China's prestige among the Buddhists and exploiting the authority of the Lamaist High Priest in its own great power interests. However, the Tibetan emigrants, of whom there are scores of thousands, are not prone to any compromise with Peking and show a strong desire to continue the struggle to drive the Chinese occupationists out of Tibet.

The PRC's relations with its neighbours are characterised by many burning issues brought about by China's infinite territorial claims, among them unambiguous declarations about its "historic rights" to Ladakh, the eastern part of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Some Chinese scholars, following in the wake of the Guomindang nationalists and chauvinists, not only assert that Ladakh was incorporated into Tibet, but even mention the "exact" figure of China's territorial "losses" (120,000 sq km) in that region, as Liu Yui wrote in his book *Tibet Today*.

The formation of India and Pakistan in 1947 brought about a score of problems in the relations between these two states, the possession of Kashmir being the most acute. The armed struggle that flared up between them did not solve the issue, and under the 1949 Agreement, the ceasefire line became the actual line of control over the disputed territory. Western Kashmir went to Pakistan which thus acquired a 500-km-long border with the PRC (Sinjiang Province).

In a bid to infringe upon India's interests and at the same time aggravate Indo-Pakistani relations, as early as 1963, China signed a frontier agreement with Pakistan which "legalised" the existence of a common frontier between China and Pakistan in the Himalayas. As Jawaharlal Nehru said, this agreement enabled Peking to control more than 30,000 sq km of territory which had never been a part of China.

Yet another aspect of the Kashmir problem, already acute, thus came into being. The Indian government protested to the way the Sino-Pakistani frontier issue had been solved and pointed out that in actual fact "there was no common border between Pakistan and China" and that in "seeking an agreement with Pakistan on the possession of Kashmir, China was interfering in a dispute between the two neighbouring nations in pursuance of its expansionist and chauvinist policy". This circumstance was also noted by a representative of India at the United Nations who decla-

red it to be unlawful. It is only natural therefore that China's meddling in Indo-Pakistani relations concerning Kashmir still further aggravated them, a fact which the Peking leadership is exploiting for its far-reaching hegemonistic plans.

Seeking to create a chain of states along India's border, which are friendly towards Peking and hostile towards Delhi, the Maoists pay a special heed to the Kingdom of Nepal, regarding that mountainous country as an important strategic bridgehead in case the situation aggravates in Hindustan.

It is no secret that geographical maps were issued in Peking reflecting its claims to the lands of some adjoining states, including Nepal, which allegedly had been a part of the Qing empire. Facts show that the Maoists have not given up their idea of "re-establishing" their "historic rights" to Nepal. China's claims to the world-famous peak of Everest caused universal indignation, particularly in Nepal, when the Chinese mountaineers having reached the summit announced it to be the greatest mountain peak... of China.

Peking has been making use of certain difficulties in relations between Katmandu and Delhi to encourage anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal. It has augmented this with constant assurances of "traditional Sino-Nepalese friendship", which did not, however, prevent Peking from conducting subversive activities in Nepal and supporting pro-Maoist and other extremist groupings there. Moreover, the Maoists openly oppose the non-alignment policy pursued by Nepal.

The Chinese leadership seeks to exploit every opportunity to meddle in the domestic affairs of Nepal. Thus, Peking takes part in economic projects there which meet its own military and political interests rather than those of the Nepalese economy. It is not by chance that prospecting and road building are given priority. The Katmandu-Kodari road leading to the border with Tibet has been built with Chinese assistance in recent years as have been other strategic highways.

The long-term Sino-Nepalese agreement of February 1975 signed in Katmandu on the construction of a 407-kilometre-long Pakhara-Surkhet road, is characteristic in this respect. The Indian *New Wave* newspaper wrote in this connection that Pakhara was already linked with major centres in Nepal and with China. When the construction is completed, the newspaper went on, China will gain access from Tibet to the western part of Nepal and other points in the vicinity of the Indian border. The agreement also provides for several tho-

usand Chinese troops to be deployed on Nepalese territory over a period of ten to fifteen years, thus facilitating China's interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal.

Similar far-reaching plans are being pursued by the Peking strategists with respect to Sikkim and Bhutan. Their plotting with the Sikkim ruler (*chogyi*) had the aim of incorporating Sikkim into China, an action which would provide the PRC with a bridgehead beyond the Himalayas. In so doing, the Chinese leaders, as usual provided "historic", "ethnographic" and other "grounds" to prop up their expansionist claims. The determined action on the part of the Indian government, however, resulted in the proclamation of Sikkim an Indian State in 1975, which caused exasperation in Peking.

China decided to deal a retaliatory blow in the adjoining Kingdom of Bhutan and invigorated its anti-Indian activity there. For this purpose, it tried to use part of the local feudal aristocracy which cherished hopes of consolidating their own position by exploiting Sino-Indian contradictions. In May 1979, however, the government of Bhutan, frightened by Peking's intensified expansion in the Himalayas, rejected official contacts with the PRC. Peking answered by bringing rude pressure to bear on Bhutan, increasing armed raids on its territory, and encouraging Chinese citizens to graze their cattle on Bhutan's border pastures without permission, thus causing concern on the part of the Indian government which has special commitments to Bhutan, among them in foreign policy. Provocations of this kind met with strong protests from the governments of Bhutan and India.

The Peking hegemonists, in their longing to get beyond the Himalayas, have long-standing plans for Afghanistan, a sovereign state which they also number among China's "lost lands". In a bid to "substantiate" these absurd claims somehow, especially with regard to Afghanistan's eastern regions, some Chinese scholars tried to prove these lands were controlled by China since the early years of our era.

The April 1978 Revolution in Afghanistan frustrated the plans of Peking which immediately came out in opposition to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. From vicious slander of the domestic and foreign policies of the DRA, the Maoists, together with the US and other reactionary regimes, switched over to support of anti-popular forces in Afghanistan to stifle the revolution. Peking engages in subversion against the progressive social and economic reforms in the DRA and fights its grow-

ing friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

As their chief weapon against Afghanistan and India, the Maoists have chosen Pakistan, to which they gave \$2,000 million in military aid. A legitimate concern on the part of the people of India was aroused by the construction of the Karakoram highway, begun in the mid-1960s. This 800-kilometre-long mountainous roadway runs from Sinjiang via the Khunjerab pass and the Indus valley to Pakistan. In the north, it meets the road built by the Chinese across China-occupied territory of Aksai Chin, and a network of new military communications in Tibet.

The commissioning of the Karakoram highway in June 1978 further aggravated the political situation in Jammu and Kashmir. The pro-Peking elements staged numerous provocations, setting fire to administrative buildings, raiding police stations, etc. These actions, the Indian Press Asia agency reported, were aimed at creating a puppet state, the "Republic of Kashmir" under Peking's auspices.

Later on, the genuine plans of the road builders became clear. On some of its sections, as transpires from foreign press reports, this is a six-lane road which is paved in such a way that it is capable of holding loads of up to 40-50 tons, that is the weight of tanks and other modern military equipment. Indian Brigadier General A. Kariappa wrote in the *Hindu* newspaper of the real danger the Karakoram highway poses to India, since it runs only some 150 kilometres from Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. The strategic importance of the road was also pointed out by *The New York Times*.

As the foreign press reports, the Karakoram highway is being used to carry Chinese weapons for Afghan counterrevolutionaries, and special centres are being set up along its route where Chinese instructors train saboteurs to be sent to Afghanistan and India. The British *Daily Telegraph* reported that Peking was smuggling arms to Afghan tribes living along the Chinese border, a fact confirmed by PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nianlung who stated that the Chinese government considered such "aid" to be its "duty". All this was crowned by an unambiguous call to "regard" Afghanistan as a "front line", made by the Deputy Chairman of the CPC CC Deng Xiaoping early in April 1981.

China's desire to get beyond the Himalayas holds a special place in its expansionist ambitions. The threat "from the North" presents a real menace to peoples of South Asia.

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